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Note 
 
That’s My Baby: Why the State’s Interest in 
Promoting Public Health Does Not Justify 
Residual Newborn Blood Spot Research Without 
Parental Consent 
Allison M. Whelan∗
On November 4, 2008, Andrea Beleno gave birth to her 
son, Joaquin, in Austin, Texas.
 
1 Like 98% of babies born in the 
United States,2 his heel was pricked and five drops of blood 
were collected and submitted to the Texas Department of State 
Health Services (TDSHS) as part of its mandatory newborn 
screening program.3 However, “in the haze after giving birth,” 
Beleno neither knew about nor consented to the screening.4 Pa-
rental consent is not required for the initial screening,5
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ents, Karen and Dan, for their unending love, support, and belief that I can do 
whatever I put my mind to. I owe you both the world. Copyright © 2013 by Al-
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 1. Mary Ann Roser, State Agrees to Destroy More than 5 Million Stored 
Blood Samples from Newborns, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 22, 2009, http:// 
www.statesman.com/news/news/state-regional/state-agrees-to-destroy-more 
-than-5-million-stored/nRZK9/ [hereinafter Roser, State Agrees to Destroy].  
 2. VANI KILAKKATHI, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, NEWBORN 
SCREENING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 4 (2012), available at http:// 
www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/WNMAKEPP1P.pdf.  
 3. Government Taking Newborn DNA Samples, KXAN (Nov. 24, 2009, 
3:00 PM), http://www.kxan.com/news/government-taking-newborn-dna 
-samples-; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 33.011(a) (2010) (re-
quiring physician to draw newborn’s blood to test for various genetic condi-
tions specified by the Department of Health). 
 4. Roser, State Agrees to Destroy, supra note 1.  
 5. For a discussion of how newborn screening developed into a state-run 
program without an informed consent requirement, see Lainie Friedman Ross, 
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tests for a variety of conditions that can be effectively treated 
through early detection.6 Beleno sued TDSHS when she 
learned the state was storing newborn blood samples (NBS)7 
“indefinitely” for research unrelated to the initial screening.8
Beleno did not object to the initial screening.
 
9 What she 
found problematic was the potentially “indefinite” retention of 
her son’s genetic material and the unknown and undisclosed 
uses of the NBS.10 Two other recent lawsuits and a series of in-
terviews demonstrate she is not alone in her concerns.11 Beleno 
worried about the misuse of her son’s genetic information, such 
as in future employment or insurance discrimination.12
Beleno’s experience is not unusual given that all fifty 
states operate newborn screening programs.
 
13 Proponents of the 
programs argue they are an important public health tool be-
cause they facilitate early detection of certain genetic diseas-
es.14
 
Mandatory Versus Voluntary Consent for Newborn Screening?, 20 KENNEDY 
INST. ETHICS J. 299, 300–02 (2010).  
 For example, the major consequence of Phenylketonuria 
 6. See, e.g., KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 10 (relating the “numerous 
personal stories from parents whose children are able to lead normal, healthy 
lives because of early screening and treatment of various genetic conditions”). 
 7. Throughout this Note “NBS” will be used to refer to the synonymous 
terms “newborn blood samples” and “newborn blood spots.”  
 8. First Amended Complaint ¶ 12, Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health 
Servs., No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB (W.D. Tex. dismissed Dec. 14, 2009), 2009 WL 
5072239 [hereinafter Beleno Complaint]. 
 9. Id. ¶ 15.  
 10. Id. ¶ 15–16.  
 11. See, e.g., Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 776 (Minn. 2011) (holding 
that the state statute regulating newborn blood tests does not authorize resid-
ual use and dissemination of NBS); Complaint ¶ 8, Higgins v. Tex. Dep’t of 
State Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (No. 510-cv-00990) 
[hereinafter Higgins Complaint] (claiming the State “knowingly, deceptively 
. . . and without the knowledge or consent of the infants’ parents, sold . . . and 
distributed [NBS] . . . to . . . third parties”); Erin Rothwell et al., Assessing 
Public Attitudes on the Retention and Use of Residual Newborn Screening 
Blood Samples: A Focus Group Study, 74 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1305, 1307 (2012) 
(compiling parents’ opinions about residual NBS retention and use).  
 12. Beleno Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 16.  
 13. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 29–37 for a chart with each state’s 
newborn screening program policies.  
 14. See, e.g., Rothwell et al., supra note 11, at 1305 (noting that “NBS is a 
core service for public health” and that testing “identif[ies] infants at high risk 
for particular conditions and would benefit from early treatment”); Michael S. 
Watson et al., Newborn Screening: Toward a Uniform Screening Panel and 
System, 8 GENETICS IN MED., May 2006, at 12S, 15S, available at https://www 
.acmg.net/resources/policies/NBS/NBS_Main_Report_00.pdf (“[N]ewborn 
  
2013] THAT’S MY BABY 421 
 
(severe mental retardation) can be prevented through early de-
tection and implementation of a low phenylalanine diet.15 But 
Beleno, and others, primarily take issue with the unclear and 
undisclosed state policies regulating storage and use of NBS 
that remain after the initial screenings and follow-up tests are 
completed.16 Parents and patient advocacy groups raise addi-
tional concerns, including: (1) the lack of informed consent re-
quired for residual NBS use in research; (2) privacy concerns; 
and (3) whether states have legitimate justifications to store 
and use residual NBS without parental consent.17
The focus of this Note is on the state’s role in residual NBS 
storage and use and whether its interest in promoting public 
health is compelling enough to overcome well-recognized paren-
tal rights to consent to their children’s medical treatment and 
research participation.
  
18
This Note argues that the government’s interest in and ob-
ligation to promote public health do not justify non-consensual 
use of NBS. Part I provides an overview of police power juris-
prudence, existing state policies regulating residual NBS stor-
age and use, and previous litigation disputing state policies and 
practices. Part II discusses the possible public health justifica-
tions for using residual NBS without parental consent and 
 The analysis draws on precedent dis-
cussing the scope of the state’s right to infringe on individual 
liberties in the interest of public health. In this context, this 
Note evaluates whether those cases in which the state’s inter-
est has prevailed are sufficiently analogous to apply to the 
state’s use of residual NBS without parental consent.  
 
screening is a highly visible and important State-based public health program 
. . . .”). 
 15. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 5. 
 16. See Beleno Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 12–18; see also KILAKKATHI, 
supra note 2, at 4 (“[T]here is also little transparency regarding storage proce-
dures or the use of the samples after they have been screened.”) (emphasis 
added); Rothwell et al., supra note 11, at 1305 (noting that research projects 
conducted after the initial screening and without parental consent “raise[] 
several ethical and legal dilemmas”).  
 17. For a discussion of the issues raised by screening, storage, and use of 
residual NBS, see KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 12–23. 
 18. See, e.g., COMM. ON CLINICAL RES. INVOLVING CHILDREN, THE ETHI-
CAL CONDUCT OF CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 146 (Marilyn J. 
Field & Richard E. Behrman eds., 2004) (discussing parents’ legal authority to 
consent to their child’s participation in research); Comm. on Bioethics, In-
formed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PE-
DIATRICS 314, 317 (1995) (“[I]n most cases, physicians have an ethical (and le-
gal) obligation to obtain parental permission to undertake[] recommended 
medical interventions.”).  
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whether this is an appropriate and permissible mechanism to 
fulfill the government’s obligation to promote public health. 
Part III concludes that the state’s interest in promoting public 
health, although important, does not justify a blanket waiver of 
parental consent. Part III then proposes a policy that states 
can, and should, implement to increase transparency and en-
sure that parental rights and children’s rights are respected 
while still promoting public health through medical research 
that aims to detect new conditions, develop new treatments, 
and eradicate disease.  
I.  GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
NBS LAWS AND RECENT LITIGATION   
Part I proceeds in three parts. Part A addresses the ten-
sions emerging from jurisprudence discussing state police pow-
ers, providing a descriptive account of the limitations on state 
police power. Part B briefly describes current state laws gov-
erning residual NBS retention and use. Part C then discusses 
recent litigation disputing residual NBS use in Minnesota and 
Texas.  
A. PRECEDENT RECOGNIZING THE STATE’S INTEREST IN 
PROTECTING AND PROMOTING PUBLIC HEALTH  
According to the Institute of Medicine, public health is 
“what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions 
for people to be healthy,” a definition which “reinforces that col-
lective entities (governments and communities) are responsible 
for healthy populations.”19 Because public health research and 
regulations aim to benefit the community as a whole, tensions 
ultimately arise between collective benefits and individual 
rights and interests.20
Notwithstanding these tensions, government intervention 
to promote public health has long been valued and viewed as an 
“unmitigated good.”
  
21
 
 19. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND 
BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR 
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 143 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www 
.thehastingscenter.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/Briefing_Book/public% 
20health%20chapter.pdf.  
 The government frequently capitalizes on 
 20. Id. (noting that public health regulations and interventions often “en-
croach on fundamental civil liberties such as privacy [and] bodily integrity”).  
 21. Lawrence O. Gostin, General Justifications for Public Health Regula-
tion, 121 PUB. HEALTH 829, 829 (2007). 
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this conventional belief to justify public health interventions 
that restrict individual liberties.22 Furthermore, courts have 
repeatedly affirmed the state’s legitimate interest in protecting 
public health and safety.23 This authority to protect public 
health and welfare falls within a state’s “police power,” a power 
which “extends . . . to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, 
comfort, and quiet of all persons.”24
Although Supreme Court rulings hold there is “no ques-
tion” that states have the “perfect right” to exercise their police 
powers when necessary,
  
25 statutes and case law illustrate that 
such rights are tempered.26 Throughout history and across a 
broad set of law and public health controversies, such as quar-
antine, mandatory vaccinations, prescription drug reporting 
requirements, and public smoking bans, courts have affirmed 
states’ use of police powers to protect public health while simul-
taneously acknowledging the powers’ limits.27
 
 22. Examples include infectious disease controls such as quarantines and 
mandatory vaccinations, public smoking restrictions, and restricting access to 
unhealthy foods to reduce obesity. See id. at 830–32. 
 
 23. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872) 
(“[P]ersons and property are subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in 
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.”); see 
also NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 492 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting the “well-recognized and far-reaching police power of 
the state over the health and welfare of its citizens”).  
 24. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 62 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 25. Id.  
 26. For example, many state quarantine laws require a state to have 
“clear and convincing evidence” that the infringements will achieve its goals 
and do so by using the “least restrictive means” possible to achieve these goals. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136 (2005); see also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325–
8(g) (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-9-1.5 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 144.419 (West 2011). 
 27. The following cases, while not an exhaustive list, illustrate this juris-
prudence. 
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1. Quarantine: Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur 
v. Louisiana State Board of Health28
In 1898, the plaintiff, a French corporation, sent a ship to 
New Orleans with cargo and over 400 passengers.
 
29 Although 
there was no evidence of infected passengers, the ship was not 
allowed to unload her cargo or passengers upon arrival in New 
Orleans.30 This was due to a recently adopted regulation giving 
the state board of health the authority to “prohibit the intro-
duction into any infected portion of the State, persons acclimat-
ed, unacclimated, or said to be immune, when in its judgment 
the introduction of such persons would add to or increase the 
prevalence of the disease.”31 The regulation’s goal was to reduce 
the number of infected individuals and prevent the spread of 
disease.32 When the ship landed, New Orleans was under quar-
antine and thus the passengers were not allowed to disembark 
the ship.33
In his opinion for the Court, Justice White referred to a 
state’s historically recognized power to enact and enforce quar-
antine laws to protect its citizens’ health and safety.
  
34 He con-
cluded that laws intending to prevent, eradicate, or control the 
spread of communicable diseases do not violate the Constitu-
tion.35 Importantly, however, Justice White noted that if a state 
uses its police power in a way that is “repugnant” to the Consti-
tution, the Constitution “must prevail.”36
2. Compulsory Vaccination: Jacobson v. Massachusetts
 
37
In 1902, Cambridge, Massachusetts’s board of health 
adopted a regulation requiring all city inhabitants to be vac-
cinated or revaccinated for smallpox because of the disease’s in-
 
 
 28. 186 U.S. 380 (1902). Most states also have public health laws specific 
to quarantine procedures. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136; IND. CODE 
ANN. § 16-41-9-1.5; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.419; see also State Quarantine and 
Isolation Statutes, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/issues 
-research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.aspx (last updated 
Aug. 2010) (listing state quarantine and isolation laws). 
 29. Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 381–82. 
 30. Id. at 382.  
 31. Id. at 385.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 382. 
 34. Id. at 387. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 387–88.  
 37. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).  
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creased prevalence in the city.38 The regulation was enacted 
under a state law giving the board of health the authority to 
require and enforce vaccination or revaccination when “neces-
sary for the public health or safety.”39
The State filed criminal charges against Jacobson after he 
refused to comply with the vaccination requirement.
 
40 Jacobson 
alleged that the Massachusetts law violated his Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.41 He was found guilty and the case eventu-
ally reached the Supreme Court. The main issue the Court ad-
dressed was whether a statute requiring a person to submit to 
vaccination was unconstitutional.42 The Court upheld the man-
date, concluding that based on the “principle of self-defense . . . 
a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic 
of disease which threatens the safety of its members” and that 
the statute was a “reasonable and proper exercise of the 
[state’s] police power.”43
Similar to Justice White in Compagnie Francaise,
  
44 Justice 
Harlan, delivering the opinion of the Court, made clear that po-
lice powers are limited and acknowledged that individuals have 
the right to dispute governmental interference with the exer-
cise of their freedom.45 If police powers are used inappropriate-
ly, arbitrarily, or oppressively, the courts may justifiably inter-
vene “to prevent wrong and oppression.”46
3. Reporting Schedule II Drug Prescriptions: Whalen v. Roe
  
47
Police powers are also invoked in contexts beyond infec-
tious disease prevention. In 1972, the New York State Legisla-
ture enacted a law requiring physicians to provide the state 
with information about all Schedule II drug prescriptions.
 
48
 
 38. Id. at 12.  
 Its 
purpose was to prevent potentially dangerous drugs from enter-
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 13. 
 41. Id. at 14.  
 42. Id. at 24.  
 43. Id. at 27, 35.  
 44. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of 
Health, 186 U.S. 380, 388 (1902). 
 45. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38.  
 46. Id.  
 47. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 48. Id. at 591–93. Schedule II drugs are those considered “the most dan-
gerous of the legitimate drugs,” such as opium, methadone, amphetamines, 
and methaqualone. Id. at 593 & n.8. 
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ing illegal markets.49 The required information included the 
prescribing physician’s name, the dispensing pharmacy, the 
drug and dosage, and the patient’s name, address, and age.50 
The information was then stored in a secure computer system 
managed by the State Department of Health.51 Under the stat-
ute, it was a crime to publicly disclose information in these rec-
ords.52 Physicians and patients claimed the law violated their 
right to privacy, intruded upon the doctor-patient relationship, 
and was “needlessly broad.”53
The Court upheld the statute, concluding it was a reasona-
ble exercise of the state’s police power.
  
54 In his concurrence, 
Justice Brennan, like his predecessors, noted the power’s limits 
and reserved the Court’s right to intervene in the future: “The 
central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data 
vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, and 
I am not prepared to say that future developments will not 
demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology.”55
4. Public Smoking Bans  
 
Two final examples involve public smoking bans. In 2003, 
New York amended the Clean Indoor Air Act to prohibit indoor 
smoking where people socialize or work.56 The law was passed 
in response to increasing scientific and medical evidence estab-
lishing a correlation between “environmental tobacco smoke” 
(ETS) (second-hand smoke) and severe health risks to non-
smokers.57 NYC C.L.A.S.H., a smokers’ rights lobbying group,58 
filed a lawsuit claiming various constitutional violations, with 
particular focus on the First Amendment.59
 
 49. Id. at 591. 
 
 50. Id. at 593.  
 51. Id. at 593–94. 
 52. Id. at 594–95.  
 53. Id. at 596.  
 54. Id. at 597–98. 
 55. Id. at 607.  
 56. NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
 57. Id.  
 58. NYC C.L.A.S.H. stands for “Citizens Lobbying Against Smoker Har-
assment.” Its goal is to “end the discrimination against smokers by exposing 
the anti-smoking lies.” NYC C.L.A.S.H., http://www.nycclash.com (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2013). 
 59. NYC C.L.A.S.H., 315 F.Supp. 2d at 467–68. 
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In its analysis, the court emphasized the significant and 
widely recognized evidence of ETS’s harms.60 The court applied 
a rational basis test under which there need only be “some ‘rea-
sonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational 
basis’” to uphold a statute.61 Relying heavily on the evidence of 
ETS’s harms, the court concluded that the smoking ban’s in-
tended goal—to protect the public “from the well-documented 
harmful effects of ETS”—provided a sufficient rational basis to 
uphold the ban.62
Ohio voters passed a similar law in 2006, the “Smoke Free 
Workplace Act,” which prohibits smoking in “public places of 
employment.”
 
63 A bar owned by Bartec Inc. failed to comply 
with the Act and was cited for numerous violations, prompting 
the Ohio Department of Health to file a complaint seeking in-
junctive relief to order compliance with the Act.64 Bartec coun-
terclaimed, alleging in part that the Act “exceed[ed] the limits 
of the state’s police powers.”65
The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed with Bartec, recogniz-
ing that property rights granted by the Ohio Constitution were 
not absolute and could be subjected “to a reasonable, 
nonarbitrary exercise of the police power . . . when exercised in 
the interest of public health, safety, morals, or welfare.”
  
66 Ac-
cording to the court, a law is in the interest of public health and 
welfare if it is “reasonable, not arbitrary, and . . . confer[s] upon 
the public a benefit commensurate with its burdens . . . .”67 The 
court upheld the Act, concluding it was a proper use of the 
state’s police power and was “neither unduly oppressive nor ar-
bitrary in its restrictions.”68
Although far from exhaustive, these cases illustrate that 
across a broad set of law and public health controversies, courts 
recognize and affirm use of police powers to protect public 
health but also acknowledge the power must be limited to pro-
tect individual freedom. Because of the potential public health 
  
 
 60. Id. at 497. 
 61. Id. at 486 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).  
 62. Id. at 492.  
 63. Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ohio 2012).  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 912. Bartec also filed a cross-claim against the Ohio Attorney 
General. Id. at 902.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 913 (quoting Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 38 N.E.2d 
70, 73 (1941)). 
 68. Id. at 914.  
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benefits of residual NBS research and the corresponding risks 
to and infringement upon personal privacy, residual NBS use 
without informed parental consent raises the question of 
whether the state’s police power can be invoked in this context.  
B. RESIDUAL NBS RETENTION AND USE: STATE LAWS  
Newborn blood screenings are performed in all fifty states69 
and test for a variety of conditions that are life-threatening if 
not diagnosed and treated shortly after birth.70 However, the 
state policies and regulations governing the specific tests per-
formed and the retention and use of residual NBS are not uni-
form,71 and parental consent is often not required for the initial 
screenings.72 And although a majority of parents are aware of 
the initial screening,73 knowledge about residual retention and 
use is more limited.74 Many parents are unaware that their 
child’s blood may be kept and stored for a number of years, if 
not indefinitely, during which time the NBS may be used in re-
search unrelated to the initial screening.75
A survey of legislation governing consent procedures for 
residual NBS storage and use indicates a wide and inconsistent 
range of policies.
  
76 Oklahoma, for example, stores the blood-
spots for forty-two days and requires written parental consent 
for continued storage and research use.77
 
 69. Michelle H. Lewis et al., State Laws Regarding the Retention and Use 
of Residual Newborn Screening Blood Samples, 127 PEDIATRICS 703, 704 
(2011). For an example of a state statute governing the initial screening re-
quirement, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.125 (West 2011).  
 On the other end of 
the spectrum, North Dakota stores the samples indefinitely 
with no specific consent required, allows the samples to be used 
for “medical, psychological, or sociological research,” and per-
 70. See Lewis et al., supra note 69, at 707. 
 71. See News Release, Johns Hopkins Univ. Genetics & Pub. Pol’y Ctr., 
Most States Unclear About Storage, Use of Baby Blood Samples, New Study 
Finds (Mar. 30, 2011) [hereinafter News Release, Johns Hopkins], available at 
http://www.dnapolicy.org/news.release.php?action=detail&pressrelease_id= 
143 (“State laws and policies governing the storage and use of [residual NBS] 
. . . range from explicit to non-existent . . . .”). 
 72. See Lewis et al., supra note 69, at 704.  
 73. In one study, 55% of parents knew the screening had been performed. 
Jeffrey R. Botkin et al., Public Attitudes Regarding the Use of Residual New-
born Screening Specimens for Research, 129 PEDIATRICS 231, 233 (2012).  
 74. See id. at 233–37.  
 75. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 15.  
 76. See id. at 29–37. 
 77. Id. at 35.  
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mits the state to “charge for access to specimens.”78 Even when 
parents are told that research may be conducted using NBS, 
the reasons given for the research are often broad (e.g., “re-
search with a significant health benefit”79) and provide little, if 
any, specific information to parents. Newborn screening infor-
mation is “confidential” in only twenty-six states, but “confiden-
tiality” does not necessarily require removal of identifying DNA 
information from the blood spots.80 The idea of confidentiality is 
thus misleading because it is possible to trace NBS back to the 
specific infants they were obtained from.81
Unclear and inexplicit state laws governing residual NBS 
storage and use have resulted in a lack of comprehensive and 
transparent policies, leaving parents and health-care providers 
ill-informed.
 
82
C. RECENT NBS LITIGATION  
 As a result, residual NBS have been the center of 
recent public debate and litigation.  
Newborn screening practices bring to the fore legal and 
ethical tensions between the state and its citizen-
ry. Researchers, physicians, and public health officials contend 
that residual NBS research promotes public health because it 
may lead to advancements in disease diagnosis and treatment 
that will benefit both the individual children from whom the 
samples were obtained and society as a whole.83 The destruc-
tion of millions of NBS required by recent disputes84
 
 78. Id. 
 is trou-
bling to public health officials and researchers who consider it a 
 79. Lewis, supra note 69, at 705.  
 80. Id. at 705–06. 
 81. Id.  
 82. News Release, Johns Hopkins, supra note 71. 
 83. Peggy Fikac, State to Destroy Newborns’ Blood Samples, HOUS. 
CHRON., Dec. 22, 2009, http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/State 
-to-destroy-newborns-blood-samples-1599212.php; see also Bradford L. 
Therrell et al., Committee Report: Considerations and Recommendations for 
National Guidance Regarding the Retention and Use of Residual Dried Blood 
Spot Specimens After Newborn Screening, 13 GENETICS MED. 621, 623 (2011) 
(discussing studies showing that use of residual NBS to develop tests has “ac-
celerated” discoveries and has had “direct public health benefits”). 
 84. See, e.g., Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 776 (Minn. 2011) (conclud-
ing that the Minnesota Department of Health could not store NBS beyond its 
statutory authorization and remanding for determination of remedy); Higgins 
v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. 801 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545–46 (W.D. Tex. 
2011) (discussing the Beleno settlement, which required destruction of NBS); 
Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB (W.D. Tex. 
dismissed Dec. 14, 2009). 
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loss of great magnitude: “a superb database has been lost. This 
database could have continued to shed light on causes of con-
genital birth defects and potentially led to preventative 
measures saving thousands of infants and their families the 
distress these defects cause.”85 There is also concern that more 
detailed and time-consuming informed consent procedures will 
increase costs, making research prohibitively expensive.86
On the other side are parents concerned about parental 
rights, privacy, and protection of their child’s sensitive genetic 
information.
 
87
1. Texas Lawsuits 
 The lack of information provided to parents 
about residual NBS use was a catalyst for recent litigation in 
Texas and Minnesota.  
In Beleno v. Texas Department of State Health Services, 
Andrea Beleno, on behalf of the class of parents and their in-
fant children, alleged that the Texas Department of State 
Health Services (TDSHS) and Texas A&M University (TAMU) 
Health Science Center “unlawfully and deceptively collected 
blood samples from their children at [the] time of birth and 
stored those samples indefinitely for undisclosed research pur-
poses, without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent . . . .”88 Beleno 
filed the lawsuit after learning her son’s NBS were being stored 
at TAMU for research.89 According to the complaint, the De-
fendants’ policies and practices violated both the law and the 
standard protocol of obtaining informed consent prior to any 
study involving human subjects.90
 
 85. Fikac, supra note 
 The parties settled and the 
83 (quoting the President of Texas A&M Health Sci-
ence Center).  
 86. For example, geneticist David Segal estimates that such changes 
could increase administrative costs for the University of California by up to 
$594,000 annually. Helen Shen, California Considers DNA Privacy Law, NA-
TURE, May 18, 2012, http://www.nature.com/news/california-considers-dna 
-privacy-law-1.10677. 
 87. See Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 769; Higgins, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 544; 
Beleno, No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB. 
 88. Beleno Complaint, supra note 8, at 1. 
 89. See id. ¶ 12; Texas to Destroy Unauthorized Blood Samples, ASSOCI-
ATED PRESS (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2009/ 
12/23/texas_to_destroy_unauthorized_blood_samples/?camp=pm. 
 90. Beleno Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 18. This section of the complaint 
refers to the human research subjects protections promulgated in 45 C.F.R. 
Part 46, of which subpart A is frequently referred to as the “Common Rule.” 
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/ 
commonrule/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Common Rule]. 
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case was dismissed with prejudice; thus no court judgment was 
rendered.91 As part of the settlement, TDSHS agreed to destroy 
approximately 4.5–5 million samples taken and stored without 
parental consent between 2002 (when TDSHS began retaining 
NBS for research) and May 27, 2009.92
Despite the settlement, the battle continued. In 2010, Jim 
Harrington, lawyer for the Beleno plaintiffs, learned that be-
tween 2003 and 2007 approximately 800 NBS were sent to the 
United States military to create a “national mitochondrial DNA 
database.”
  
93 The database was never mentioned during the 
lawsuit, and Harrington claimed he was repeatedly assured 
that the NBS were used only for medical research and not law 
enforcement purposes.94 A new class action lawsuit was filed, 
claiming that TDSHS “deceptively [and] unlawfully . . . sold, 
traded, bartered, and distributed [NBS] . . . to private research 
companies, government agencies, and other third parties,” in-
cluding the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.95 Although the 
case was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing,96
2. Minnesota: Bearder v. State
 it illus-
trates continuing questions and concerns about residual NBS 
research.  
97
In contrast to the settled
 
98 or dismissed99
 
 91. See Order of Dismissal, with Prejudice, Beleno v. Lakey, No. SA-09-
CA-188-FB (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009); Becca Aaronson, Lawsuit Alleges DSHS 
Sold Baby DNA Samples, TEX. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2010, http://www.texastribune 
.org/2010/12/08/lawsuit-alleges-dshs-sold-baby-dna-samples/. 
 disputes in Texas, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a full opinion on a similar 
 92. Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Newborn Blood Spot Banking: Approaches to 
Consent, PREDICTER L. & POL’Y UPDATE, (Ind. Univ. Ctr. Bioethics, Indianap-
olis, Ind.), Mar. 12, 2010, at 10, available at http://bioethics.iu.edu/index.php/ 
download_file/view/91/.  
 93. Mary Ann Roser, Suit Possible over Baby DNA Sent to Military Lab 
for National Database, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 22, 2010, http://www 
.statesman.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/suit-possible-over-baby 
-dna-sent-to-military-lab-1/nRqkT/.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Higgins Complaint, supra note 11, ¶ 8; see also Aaronson, supra note 
91 (discussing the state’s trade of NBS for lab supplies and services valued 
around half a million dollars from a private company). 
 96. Higgins v. Texas Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553, 555 
(W.D. Tex. 2011). 
 97. 806 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011). 
 98. See Order of Dismissal, with Prejudice, Beleno v. Lakey, No. SA-09-
CA-188-FB (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009). Prior to dismissal, the parties settled. 
See id. 
  
432 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:419 
 
issue in Bearder v. State in 2011.100 What was unique about 
Bearder was that the Plaintiffs brought a cause of action under 
Minnesota’s Genetic Privacy Act (GPA),101 which “protects the 
genetic privacy and DNA property rights of all Minnesotans, 
including newborns.”102 The statute provides that an individu-
al’s genetic information may only be collected with the individ-
ual’s written informed consent, used for the purposes specified 
by the informed consent, used only for the length of time con-
sented to, and cannot be disseminated to other parties without 
additional written informed consent.103 According to the Plain-
tiffs, the state stored the NBS without parental consent and 
shared the samples with private entities and hospitals.104
Minnesota’s policy was to retain residual NBS unless there 
was a specific request that the samples be destroyed.
  
105 As of 
December 31, 2008, more than 800,000 NBS were stored, da-
ting back to 1997, and more than 50,000 NBS had been used in 
studies for purposes unrelated to the initial newborn screen-
ings.106 The majority of NBS research uses “de-identified” sam-
ples,107 and under the current federal regulation known as the 
“Common Rule,”108
 
 99. See Higgins, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 553, 555. The case was dismissed for 
lack of standing. Id. 
 studies involving de-identified health rec-
ords and information are exempt from federal privacy protec-
 100. Bearder, 806 N.W.2d. 
 101. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.386 (West 2011) (granting a statutory right to 
privacy of genetic information).  
 102. First Amended Complaint at 34, Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766 
(Minn. 2011) (No. 09-5615), 2009 WL 5427622 [hereinafter Bearder Com-
plaint]. 
 103. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.386. 
 104. Bearder Complaint, supra note 102, at 4. 
 105. Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 770.  
 106. Id. at 770–71.  
 107. Id. at 771. A de-identified sample is coded and separated from identi-
fiers, but identifiers are kept and can be retrieved so that the sample can be 
linked back to the individual. In contrast, anonymous samples lack identifiers 
to link back to the donor. For an explanation of anonymous and de-identified 
samples, see STEVE OLSON & ADAM C. BERGER, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTU-
NITIES IN USING RESIDUAL NEWBORN BLOOD SCREENING SAMPLES FOR 
TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 31–32 (2010), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12981&page=31; Mark A. Roth-
stein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Protect Health Privacy in Research?, AM. 
J. BIOETHICS, Sept. 2010, at 3.  
 108. See Common Rule, supra note 90. 
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tions and federal regulations governing human subject re-
search.109
The Plaintiffs filed a number of claims, including violation 
of the GPA.
 
110 The State argued it did not violate the GPA be-
cause (1) blood samples are not “genetic information” under the 
GPA; and (2) Minnesota’s “newborn screening statutes ‘express-
ly provide’ that the Department of Health may use, store, and 
disseminate . . . genetic information without first obtaining 
written informed consent.”111 The district court granted the 
State’s motion to dismiss112 and the court of appeals affirmed.113 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “ge-
netic information” under the GPA “includes the actual blood 
samples as ‘medical or biological’ information.”114 Therefore 
NBS are protected by the GPA, which requires “written in-
formed consent to collect, use, store, or disseminate those sam-
ples.”115
 
 109. For instance, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2012) states that “[r]esearch, 
involving the collection or study of . . . specimens” is exempt from § 46 protec-
tions such as Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval and informed consent 
“if the information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that sub-
jects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the sub-
jects.” The regulations comprising § 46 embody many of the ethical principles 
and guidelines articulated in “The Belmont Report.” See Belmont Report: Eth-
ical Principals and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Re-
search, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Sub-
jects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 
1979) [hereinafter The Belmont Report]. Similarly, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 ex-
cludes health information “that does not identify an individual and . . . there is 
no reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify an 
individual.” There are also exceptions to § 164.514, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) “Privacy Rule.” Rothstein, supra 
note 
 In response to the State’s claim that the newborn 
screening statutes exempted it from the informed consent re-
quirement, the court held that the statutes provide an exemp-
tion from the GPA requirements only for “testing the samples 
for . . . disorders, recording and reporting those test results, 
maintaining a registry of positive [results], and storing those 
107, at 4. 
 110. Bearder Complaint, supra note 102, at 5. 
 111. Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 771–72 (Minn. 2011). 
 112. Bearder v. State, No. 27-CV-09-5615, 2009 WL 5454446 (Minn. Dist. 
Ct., Nov. 24, 2009), aff’d, 788 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 806 
N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011).  
 113. Bearder v. State, 788 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d 806 
N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011).  
 114. Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 774.  
 115. Id.  
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results as required by federal law.”116 The exemptions do not 
authorize the state to use, store, or disseminate the samples for 
other purposes.117
As a result of the court’s decision, the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Health was ordered to destroy all NBS after they are 
stored for seventy-one days.
 
118 The destruction includes all NBS 
collected on or after the Minnesota Supreme Court decision on 
November 16, 2011.119
Bearder represents the first, but likely not the last, court 
decision limiting state use of residual NBS without informed 
parental consent. Because of the potential public health bene-
fits of residual NBS research, state policies should be scruti-
nized to determine whether the policies are justified under a 
state’s police powers or whether changes must be made to in-
clude an informed consent procedure.  
 
II.  PUBLIC HEALTH AND RESIDUAL NBS RESEARCH   
Supreme Court jurisprudence discussing a state’s interest 
in public health indicates that states may act to prevent or re-
duce the risk of harm to the public even if such protection re-
quires infringing on individual rights, autonomy, and  priva-
cy.120 The infringements involved in using NBS without 
parental consent, however, cannot be justified by the reasoning 
used in the previously discussed case law.121
 
 116. Id. at 776.  
 Part A of this sec-
tion discusses important differences between governmental use 
of residual NBS for public health research and the state poli-
 117. Id. at 1. 
 118. News Release, Minn. Dep’t of Health, Minnesota Department of 
Health to Begin Destroying Newborn Blood Spots in Order to Comply with Re-
cent Minnesota Supreme Court Ruling (Jan. 31, 2012) [hereinafter News Re-
lease, Minn. Dep’t of Health], available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/ 
news/pressrel/2012/newborn013112.html. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (“There 
are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the 
common good. . . . Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of the 
principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, 
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that 
may be done to others.”). Justice Harlan noted that the Court had “more than 
once recognized it as a fundamental principle that ‘persons and property are 
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general 
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.’” Id. (quoting Hannibal & St. J.R. 
Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877)).  
 121. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of precedent.  
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cies at issue in precedent, arguing that there is a frequently ig-
nored distinction between protection and promotion of public 
health and that in both circumstances the risks and benefits 
must be weighed. Part B then scrutinizes who actually benefits 
from the research, given the tenuous connections between re-
sidual NBS research and public health benefits discussed in 
Part A. 
A. PROTECTING VERSUS PROMOTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH: 
WEIGHING THE RISKS AND BENEFITS  
The precedent cases address state laws and policies that 
infringe on individual rights primarily to protect the public 
from other individuals’ actions or behaviors such as smoking,122 
illegal drug sales,123 or spreading communicable diseases.124 In 
such circumstances, statutes and case law recognize a state’s 
right to police individual behavior to prevent harms to innocent 
society members.125 As a society, we value individual freedom 
but recognize its limits when such freedom endangers the wel-
fare of others.126 Residual NBS research, however, is more 
about public health promotion127
1. Residual NBS Research: Protection or Promotion? 
 rather than protection—and 
there is an important difference between the two. In either con-
text, it is important to weigh the benefits of any policy requir-
ing restrictions on individual rights. 
Quarantine laws, vaccination laws, and public smoking 
bans provide clear, well-documented public protections.128
 
 122. NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 
(S.D.N.Y 2004); Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 898, 904–05 (Ohio 2012). 
 The 
 123. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591–93 (1977). 
 124. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 34–35 (construing Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 
97 (N.Y. 1904)); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. 
of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 381 (1902). 
 125. See supra Part I.A. 
 126. According to John Stuart Mill, “The only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others.” JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (1859).  
 127. Public health promotion may occur, for example, by facilitating dis-
covery of new diseases or treatments.  
 128. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Community Immunity 
(“Herd Immunity”), VACCINES.GOV., http://www.vaccines.gov/basics/protection/ 
index.html (last updated Oct. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Community Immunity] 
(noting that when the majority of people are immunized, the rest of the com-
munity is usually protected because there is little opportunity for an out-
break). 
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harms to be avoided can be clearly articulated—such as pre-
venting the spread of contagious diseases129—and the methods 
used by the states are usually taken only after consideration of 
less-intrusive measures. Delaware’s isolation/quarantine law, 
for example, is only used “during a state of emergency” and re-
quires the State to use the “least restrictive means necessary” to 
prevent disease transmission.130 Similarly, during a public 
health emergency, Virginia law authorizes the State Health 
Commissioner to “requir[e] immediate immunization of all per-
sons.”131 Public smoking bans have been upheld and their justi-
fications buttressed by significant evidence of ETS’s harms,132 
and are further supported by evidence that such bans have suc-
cessfully reduced tobacco-related illnesses.133 Underlying these 
court decisions is a recognition that the harms to be avoided 
outweigh the possible harms caused by infringements on indi-
vidual rights.134
In contrast, there is no similar clarity about health protec-
tions from residual use of NBS.
 
135
 
 129. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 34; Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 381. 
 Public health officials and re-
searchers imply that harms could result if NBS are unavailable 
for research. Officials in Minnesota, for example, argue that de-
stroying the residual NBS data bank “will compromise [the 
state’s] ability to assure the quality and accuracy of the new-
born screening program,” suggesting that harms may occur 
 130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(1)(c) (2005) (emphasis added). Many 
other states have similar “least restrictive means necessary” requirements in 
their quarantine statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-788 (2009); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.419 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:13-15 (West 
2007).  
 131. The only exception is if a physician certifies, in writing, that the vac-
cine could be harmful to the particular individual. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48 
(2011).  
 132. “[T]he evidence against ETS is consistent, profound, and widely-
accepted.” NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 497 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
 133. In addition to reducing tobacco-related illnesses, there is evidence that 
smoking bans may also reduce alcohol abuse. See Smoking Bans in Bars Help 
Drinkers Drink Less Too, Yale Study Shows, YALE NEWS (Sept. 24, 2012), 
http://news.yale.edu/2012/09/24/smoking-bans-bars-help-drinkers-drink-less 
-too-yale-study-shows [hereinafter Smoking Bans in Bars].  
 134. In Jacobson, the Court agreed with “most of the members of the medi-
cal profession” that the risk of harm from a vaccination is “generally . . . too 
small to be seriously weighed as against the benefits coming from . . . use of the 
preventive . . . .” 197 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).  
 135. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing the “mismatch” be-
tween promised and actual benefits of research using NBS). 
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from inaccurate test results.136
Yet even if the “harms” do occur, they are neither as clear 
nor as compelling as those at issue in the case law. And per-
haps more importantly, there are less intrusive methods avail-
able to ensure an adequate supply of residual NBS for research, 
such as an opt-in informed consent procedure, which will be 
discussed below.
  
137
In addition to the protection-based argument, states are al-
so interested in promoting societal health and well-being by us-
ing NBS to conduct research that aims to discover new diseases 
and develop new and improved therapies.
  
138 Arguments based 
on public health promotion rather than protection are even 
more problematic and lack a firm grounding in either statutory 
or case law previously discussed.139 Researchers and the public 
health community tend to default to a public health promotion 
rationale despite the speculative nature of these claims. How-
ever, the inherent uncertainty in medical research limits the 
ability to promise or guarantee society-wide benefits.140 In an 
era of impressive medical and scientific advancements and 
grand promises for miracle vaccines, treatments, and cures,141
 
 136. News Release, Minn. Dep’t of Health, supra note 
 it 
118. Other reasons 
to store and use residual NBS include: (1) improving the quality of screening 
methods; (2) enabling “comparison and validation of new analytical methods”; 
(3) use in public health research; and (4) use in research to “enhance general 
medical knowledge.” OLSON & BERGER, supra note 107, at 10. 
 137. Even though these less-intrusive measures may be slightly more bur-
densome on the state, requiring parental consent “would arguably be less pri-
vacy invasive than conducting research without the parents’ knowledge.” 
KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 11; see also infra Part III.A (proposing an in-
formed consent procedure for residual NBS use).  
 138. “[A] generally acknowledged component[] of a newborn screening sys-
tem . . . includes . . . assessments of long-term benefits to individuals, families, 
and society.” Watson et al., supra note 14, at 15S. 
 139. The relevant statutes and case law are largely written in terms of pro-
tections and harms. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136 (2005) (authoriz-
ing isolation and quarantine during a public health emergency); Whalen v. 
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (asserting that the state has a “vital interest in 
controlling . . . dangerous drugs”) (emphasis added); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27 
(concluding that communities have the right to protect themselves from dis-
ease based on “self-defense”).  
 140. See, e.g., KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 11 (noting the “less grand bene-
fits of screening” than those promised by the American College of Medical Ge-
netics).  
 141. See, e.g., Nic Fleming, Cancer Cure ‘May Be Available in Two Years’, 
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ 
1563521/Cancer-cure-may-be-available-in-two-years.html (discussing, in 2007, 
scientists’ assertions that “[c]ancer sufferers could be cured with injections of 
immune cells from other people within two years”).  
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is important to be cautious of allowing such speculative prom-
ises to justify intrusions on personal freedoms. Newborn 
screenings have been performed for over forty years142 and re-
sidual NBS have been used in a variety of studies,143 but there 
have been few, if any, major “breakthroughs,” broadly felt pub-
lic health benefits, or prevention of public health crises from 
research results.144
A primary rationale for residual NBS research is to ensure 
the initial tests’ accuracy and to prevent false positives and 
false negatives.
  
145 However, quality assurance and accuracy re-
search have not yielded such benefits. For example, one study 
concluded that there has been little change in the tests’ “posi-
tive predictive values” (PPV), which measure the probability 
that a patient with a positive test result actually has the indi-
cated disorder.146 Some states have a PPV of only 3%, meaning 
that 97% of infants who initially test positive do not actually 
have the disease.147
 
 142. Newborn screening programs began in the United States in the 1960s. 
KILAKKATHI, supra note 
 Quality assurance research is important, 
but grand promises of medical breakthroughs should not be 
2, at 5.  
 143. See, e.g., V.W. Burse et al., Preliminary Investigation of the Use of 
Dried-Blood Spots for the Assessment of in Utero Exposure to Environmental 
Pollutants, 61 BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR MED. 236, 238 (1997) (concluding 
that NBS are a “valuable resource and cost-effective” source of information for 
a variety of different studies, such as the impact of prenatal exposure to envi-
ronmental toxins); Karin B. Nelson et al., Neuropeptides and Neurotrophins in 
Neonatal Blood of Children with Autism or Mental Retardation, 49 ANNALS 
NEUROLOGY 597, 597 (2001) (using NBS to examine biological causes/origins of 
autism and mental retardation); Gary M. Shaw et al., Genetic Variation of In-
fant Reduced Folate Carrier (A80G) and Risk of Orofacial and Conotruncal 
Heart Defects, 158 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 747, 747 (2003) (analyzing residual 
NBS and finding “modest evidence for a gene-nutrient interaction” between a 
gene implicated in cleft palate, heart defects, and maternal intake of folic ac-
id).  
 144. In fact, “[w]hen asked about other applications of newborn screening, 
[no] public health officials consulted . . . could offer examples of research pro-
jects that had yielded results aligned with the promises” made by the Ameri-
can College of Medical Genetics and Genomics, such as gaining a better un-
derstanding of diseases or developing a method for earlier interventions. 
KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 9, 11.  
 145. See id. at 11 (discussing states’ performance of “quality assurance 
studies”).  
 146. Id. at 10–11 (citing JoNel Aleccia, Babies’ Blood Tests Can End in 
False-Positive Screening Scares, MSNBC (May 9, 2011, 8:33 AM), http://www 
.today.com/id/42829175/ns/today-today_health/t/babiesblood-tests-can-end 
-false-positive-screening-scares/#.UifzROZQFlr).  
 147. Id. at 11.  
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used to justify a blanket waiver of informed parental consent.148
The lack of significant findings or developments from re-
sidual NBS research raises serious questions about whether 
the proposed benefits of such research outweigh the potential 
risks and harms to individual rights and personal privacy. Be-
cause of the tenuous connections between protecting and pro-
moting public health and NBS research, arguments attempting 
to justify a blanket waiver of consent for residual NBS use 
must fail. 
  
2. Residual NBS Retention and Research: The Risks Are Real 
In addition to the lack of significant benefits from residual 
NBS research, there are also real and legitimate risks of harm, 
particularly invasions to privacy. Risk-benefit ratios play an 
important role in precedent cases recognizing legitimate re-
strictions on individual rights.149 It is therefore appropriate to 
analyze whether the alleged public health benefits of residual 
NBS research outweigh the potential risks. Residual NBS are 
stored in “DNA databanks,” and parents are concerned about 
potential genetic privacy violations150 that can impact both the 
infant and his or her parents because certain genetic abnormal-
ities of a child indicate the same abnormality in the parents.151 
Fears of privacy breaches cannot be discounted or dismissed as 
“paranoi[d]” or “irrational.”152
 
 148. See, e.g., id. (“[W]hile formulating screening tests and ensuring that 
existing tests meet certain quality standards are certainly beneficial applica-
tions of newborn screening, they seem to fall short of the stated promises of 
elucidating disease characteristics and generating earlier interventions.”).  
 Security breaches can and do oc-
cur at biological databanks, such as a laptop theft from the 
 149. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 
U.S. 11 (1905); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. 
of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902); NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 
F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 898 
(Ohio 2012). 
 150. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 16–17.  
 151. For example, if an infant has Huntington’s disease, this indicates that 
at least one of his parents also has Huntington’s because it is an autosomal 
dominant disorder. U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Huntington Disease, GENETICS 
HOME REFERENCE (September 9, 2013), http://www.ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/ 
huntington-disease.  
 152. Attempts at discounting these fears have been made before. See 
Taralyn Tan, Newborns’ DNA: Don’t Deny Scientists This Useful Resource, 
GENETIC ENG’G & BIOTECH. NEWS, http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/ 
newborns-dna-don-t-denyscientists-this-useful-resource/4377/ (last visited Oct. 
17, 2013). Others note though that “privacy breaches [are] not just a hypothet-
ical problem.” KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 16. 
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Cord Blood Registry, the largest stem cell bank in the world.153
Some argue that these privacy concerns are unfounded be-
cause the samples can be de-identified before research use and 
thus do not require the additional protections typically afforded 
to human subjects research under the Common Rule.
  
154 These 
arguments, however, are unsatisfactory because although de-
identified samples are not directly identifiable, they are not 
completely “anonymous,” and research shows that de-identified 
samples can be linked back to the individual.155 Despite assur-
ances that genetic data is de-identified and confidential, 
“[s]cientists have been aware for years of the possibility that 
coded or ‘anonymized’ sequenced DNA may be more readily 
linked to an individual as genetic databases proliferate.”156 In 
one study, researchers were able to “accurately and robustly 
determine” whether a specific individual’s DNA was present in 
a “complex genomic DNA mixture.”157
Given the misunderstood definitions of de-identification, 
arguments that the de-identification process eliminates the po-
tential for privacy breaches and dissemination of personal bio-
logical and genetic information do not pass scientific muster.
 
158
 
 153. KILAKKATHI, supra note 
 
2, at 16.  
 154. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment Based on 
Mootness at 6, Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., No. SA-09-CA-
0188-FB (W.D. Tex. dismissed Dec. 14, 2009), 2009 WL 5072237 (stating that 
under TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33.018, de-identified information “may 
be released without consent” when it is being disclosed for a number of pur-
poses, including research approved by the Institutional Review Board); see al-
so sources cited supra note 107. 
 155. Rothstein, supra note 107, at 3, 5–6. “Identifiability exists on a con-
tinuum” and is affected by the particular de-identification technique used. Id.  
 156. Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, No Longer De-Identified, 312 
SCI. 370, 370 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 157. Nils Homer et al., Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts 
of DNA to Highly Complex Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping Mi-
croarrays, PLOS GENETICS, Aug. 29, 2008, at 1, 1, available at http://www 
.plosgenetics.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371% 
2Fjournal.pgen.1000167&representation=PDF; see also Melissa Gymrek et al., 
Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 SCI. 321, 323–24 
(2013) (reporting results of a study in which researchers were able to deter-
mine the identities of fifty study participants from genetic information that 
had supposedly been de-identified). 
 158. See Rothstein, supra note 107, at 3. Researchers have been able to 
take “seemingly anonymous DNA database entries . . . and specifically identify 
the persons who are the subjects of the information even though the DNA in-
formation” had been de-identified. Bradley Malin & Latanya Sweeney, Re-
Identification of DNA Through an Automated Linkage Process, PROC. J. AM. 
MED. INFO. ASS’N SYMP. 423, 423 (2001). Even if complete and irreversible de-
identification were possible, non-consensual use of an individual’s genetic in-
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The ambiguity of the term “de-identification” was noted by the 
Plaintiffs in Bearder, who stated that “it is not so clear what 
[the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH)] means when 
they say that the blood samples and test data are ‘de-
identified.’”159 In response to the Plaintiffs’ request for docu-
ments detailing MDH’s de-identification procedure, the De-
fendants replied that “[n]o documents exist showing MDH pro-
cesses of de-identification and reidentification,” indicating that 
there is no established de-identification procedure and that the 
process and standards “vary from project to project and are 
subject to subjective standards.”160 Given that it is possible to 
re-identify de-identified samples, the Common Rule protec-
tions—including informed consent161—should apply to residual 
NBS because the Rule only exempts information that “cannot 
be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the sub-
jects.”162
It is important to recognize that the potential privacy 
harms are both tangible and intangible. Many are primarily 
concerned about employment and/or insurance discrimination, 
but for others the mere fact that one’s privacy has been violated 
is viewed as “an intrinsic harm separate from discrimina-
tion.”
  
163 Given the uncertain benefits and the real and legiti-
mate risks of harm, informed consent and transparency are 
even more important because of the inherent value many place 
on their right to privacy and their desire to control what hap-
pens to their infant’s residual NBS.164
 
formation is still questionable and raises issues regarding the inherent harms 
of disregarding autonomy, individual rights, and privacy rights. Analysis of 
the issue if complete de-identification were possible, however, is beyond the 
scope of this particular paper.  
 Indeed, many parents 
would consent to residual use of their infant’s NBS; they simply 
 159. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law at 33, Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 
766 (Minn. 2011) (No. 27-CV-09-5615), 2009 WL 5427609. 
 160. Id. (emphasis added). 
 161. “[N]o investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research 
covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective 
informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representa-
tive.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2012).  
 162. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2012). 
 163. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 17–18.  
 164. “It’s respect. It should be an opt-in. I give my permission to do this.” 
Rothwell et al., supra note 11, at 1307 (quoting focus group participants’ 
thoughts on research with residual NBS).  
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want to be asked and informed first.165 As one parent succinctly 
stated: “I want to have the choice.”166
B. RISK-BENEFIT RATIOS: WHO REALLY BENEFITS? 
  
If residual NBS research is beneficial, it must be deter-
mined who will actually benefit and whether the benefits and 
burdens are fairly distributed.167 Scientific research using bio-
logical and genetic information from any source can benefit so-
ciety as a whole,168 but speculative promises are inadequate to 
justify nonconsensual use of a person’s genetic material.169 If 
new diseases are discovered or new treatments developed 
through NBS research there is no guarantee that the majority 
of the public will benefit. The unclear distribution of benefits 
contrasts to the actual, broadly felt public health benefits of 
policies such as smoking bans170 and mandatory vaccinations,171 
which can—and do—benefit the greater public. It is likely that 
residual NBS research is, at least in part, facilitated by private 
financial interest.172
We no longer live in the era of Jonas Salk, who, when 
asked who owned the patent to his newly developed polio vac-
cine, responded, “Well, the people, I would say. There is no pa-
  
 
 165. “What’s important is just giving people a choice. I don’t like not having 
a choice and that’s what bothers me.” Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. The Belmont Report obligates the just allocation of benefits and bur-
dens in human subject research. The Belmont Report, supra note 109. 
 168. See, e.g., REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 
2 (2010) (discussing the use of Lacks’ cells to facilitate “some of the most im-
portant advances in medicine: the polio vaccine, chemotherapy, cloning, gene 
mapping, in vitro fertilization”).  
 169. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 11 (suggesting that “the ‘public 
health benefits’ cited by . . . public health officials and patients’ groups may 
not live up to their promise”).  
 170. Smoking Bans in Bars, supra note 133 (“Bans on smoking in bars and 
restaurants . . . reduce tobacco-related illnesses . . . .”).  
 171. See, e.g., Community Immunity, supra note 128 (explaining the con-
cept of herd immunity).  
 172. “Part of the issue is that some parents are concerned that the state or 
private companies could profit from the use of their children’s blood samples.” 
News Release, Johns Hopkins, supra note 71 (quoting Michelle Lewis) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also Aaronson, supra note 91 (quoting attor-
ney Jim Harrington, who, in response to the possibility that the Texas De-
partment of State Health Services sold and/or traded NBS to commercial 
entities, stated that “[i]t’s one thing to opt in to a research program that’s non-
profit; it’s another thing to have your DNA or your kid’s DNA used by a com-
pany to make millions of millions of dollars”).  
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tent. Could you patent the sun?”173 Salk’s response suggests 
that benefitting “the public as a whole” must at times take 
precedence over innovators’ rights.174 But times have changed, 
and today a major driver of innovation—particularly in medi-
cine—is profit potential,175 and both states and researchers 
profit from residual NBS research.176 Profitability and promot-
ing health and well-being do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. 
When courts have recognized justifiable restrictions on individ-
ual rights for public health purposes, the primary reasons for 
the restrictions have been to protect the public from immi-
nent177 or well-evidenced long-term harms.178 Unlike NBS re-
search, neither the state nor private entities had secondary, 
profit-driven motives in precedent case law.179
The potential for profit incentives to play a role in NBS re-
search raises questions about whether the promised benefits 
(new discoveries, treatments, etc.) will be available to “the pub-
lic.” Providing broad public access to screenings and treatments 
to promote public health is generally not a highly profitable en-
terprise,
  
180
 
 173. Krysta Kauble, Comment, Patenting Everything Under the Sun: In-
voking the First Amendment to Limit the Use of Gene Patents, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1123, 1125 (2011).  
 and despite a history of non-profit provision of care, 
 174. Id.  
 175. See id. at 1131–32 (discussing the practice of granting patents on 
“product[s] of nature,” and the increasing “financial interest in gene patents”). 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California is another example of issues 
arising from profit-driven medical research. The case involved a doctor using a 
patient’s tissues without consent for research resulting in a patent that had a 
predicted profit potential of $3 billion. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 174 (Cal. 1990).  
 176. See Aaronson, supra note 91 (discussing the Texas Department of 
State Health Services’ trade of NBS for expensive lab supplies).  
 177. A highly contagious disease would be considered an imminent harm. 
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905); Compagnie Francaise 
de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 381 (1902). 
 178. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1977) (upholding a law 
meant to prevent misuse of dangerous drugs); NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of 
New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (noting “mounting scien-
tific evidence” linking ETS “to serious health risks to non-smokers”); Wymsylo 
v. Bartec, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 898, 904–05 (Ohio 2012), reconsideration denied, 
971 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio 2012) (“[S]tudies have conclusively shown that exposure 
to secondhand smoke . . . causes illness and disease . . . .”). 
 179. On the contrary, many business owners feared smoking bans would 
decrease their profits. See Wymsylo, 970 N.E.2d at 915 (rejecting appellants’ 
claim regarding a decline in gross sales).  
 180. For example, pharmaceutical companies have little incentive to pro-
duce the flu-shot or other low-cost and therefore lower-profit vaccines, prefer-
ring to invest in high-cost drug development. The highest grossing vaccine has 
yearly sales of about $1 billion, whereas a drug for diabetes can have annual 
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our health care system has become increasingly commercial-
ized.181 States and researchers assure the public that NBS re-
search will result in beneficial medical advancements, but they 
do not further promise that these benefits will actually be 
available to society as a whole. For example, if an effective 
treatment was developed for a particular disease using NBS, 
would states subsidize this treatment to make it affordable, or 
would it be prohibitively expensive, preventing many from 
reaping the benefits of NBS research? It seems unlikely states 
will—or even can—make such promises. Thus it may be naïve 
to assume NBS research will provide the broad “public” bene-
fits that have been promised, given today’s profit-driven cli-
mate.182 And although a public health benefit need not be uni-
versally experienced by every individual, the ability to benefit 
should not be dependent on ability to pay.183
Justifying privacy infringements as serious as those involv-
ing an individual’s genetic information based on a public health 
promotion argument could justify far too many other infringe-
ments and make it difficult to draw lines in the future. For ex-
ample, if states can justify NBS use for public health-promoting 
 
 
sales of more than $7 billion. Tim Krohn, Sick Days, Manufacturing Vaccine 
Equal Bad Business, FREE PRESS, Jan. 9, 2013, http://mankatofreepress.com/ 
local/x964869559/Krohn-Sick-days-manufacturing-vaccine-equal-bad-business. 
 181. For a discussion of a non-profit versus for-profit health care system, 
see Claire Andre & Manuel Velasquez, A Healthy Bottom Line: Profits or Peo-
ple?, 1 ISSUES IN ETHICS, no. 4, Summer 1988, available at http://www.scu.edu/ 
ethics/publications/iie/v1n4/healthy.html; see also Paul A. Offit, Why Are 
Pharmaceutical Companies Gradually Abandoning Vaccines?, 24 HEALTH AF-
FAIRS 622, 622 (2005) (noting that pharmaceutical companies are driven by 
profits because they are “businesses, not public health agencies”).  
 182. It could be argued that curing a previously incurable disease, no mat-
ter how small the affected population, justifies nonconsensual NBS research. 
However, it would be inappropriate to use the state’s police powers to justify 
such intrusion on individual rights and autonomy. Although we may wish that 
the state would do so, it has no obligation to eradicate all potential or existing 
diseases. In a public health context, police powers are invoked when necessary 
to protect the broader public, which by definition requires a benefit to more 
than just a small number of individuals. Indeed, “a principal aim of public 
health is to achieve the greatest health benefits for the greatest number of 
people.” PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER 14 (Lawrence O. Gostin 
ed., 2d ed. 2010) (emphasis added).  
 183. The very nature of a public health system is to ensure that persons in 
need are not denied care based on ability to pay. See, e.g., The Ethics of Health 
Care Reform: Issues in Emergency-Medicine—An Information Paper, AM. 
COLL. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, http://www.acep.org/Content.aspx?id=80871 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (stating that public health insurance programs ex-
ist, in part, because “[w]e are unwilling to deny health care to other persons in 
need”). 
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research, perhaps they could also justify mandatory organ pro-
curement from all deceased citizens—with or without consent. 
There is much stronger evidence of the benefits from organ do-
nation than from residual NBS research; organ donations can—
and do—save lives,184 which contrasts with the mere assump-
tions that NBS research will lead to beneficial discoveries and 
developments.185 Using similar justifications, states could at-
tempt to mandate all types of research participation, such as 
clinical trials for new drugs that could, if approved, benefit the 
public health.186
The value American society places on autonomy, personal 
privacy, and the right to control one’s own body requires the 
conclusion that the potential benefits of residual NBS research 
do not outweigh its possible tangible
  
187 and intangible188
 
 184. Over 28,000 organ transplants were performed in 2012. Organ Dona-
tion, DONATE LIFE AM., http://donatelife.net/understanding-donation/organ 
-donation/ (last updated Mar. 2013). Approximately 75% of patients receiving 
a heart transplant survive at least five years post-transplant. Nat’l Heart, 
Lung, & Blood Inst., What Is a Heart Transplant?, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS. (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/ht/. 
 harms. 
The state’s interest in promoting public health is neither an 
adequate nor compelling enough justification to allow a blanket 
waiver of informed parental consent. This conclusion does not, 
however, require states to end residual NBS use altogether. In-
stead, states must develop and implement informed consent 
policies and increase the transparency of their residual NBS 
policies. Part III proposes possible mechanisms for implement-
ing and improving an informed consent process.  
 185. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
 186. These justifications could also extend to contexts outside of public 
health. Justifying infringements on the individual rights of a vast majority of 
the population (i.e., all newborn infants and their parents) to benefit very few 
individuals could permit the state to justify almost any action, as long as it 
protects/benefits even just one individual. For example, would we want the 
state to justify mass unwarranted searches and seizures of homes based on the 
premise that 1 in 500 will turn up an illegal activity (if we assume catching 
criminals is in the public’s interest)? Although this analogy is not exact, it ac-
curately exposes the risks and benefits behind the “common good” argument. 
 187. “Tangible harms” refer to risks of privacy/confidentiality breaches and 
the harms that could result if a biobank security system were breached and 
resulted in dissemination of a person’s genetic information.  
 188. “Intangible harms” is used to refer to the inherent disrespect felt by 
individuals who were not given the opportunity to consent to the state’s use of 
their child’s genetic information.  
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III.  DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ADEQUATE INFORMED CONSENT POLICIES FOR THE 
RETENTION AND USE OF RESIDUAL NBS   
Good intentions and speculative benefits do not give a state 
an absolute and un-tempered power to intrude on individual 
rights.189 When restricting individual liberties, a state should 
have “clear and convincing evidence”190 that the infringements 
will achieve its goal(s) and should use the “least restrictive 
means” possible to achieve these goals.191
New parents are, in many ways, a captive audience. New 
parents may feel overwhelmed after their child’s birth,
 In the context of re-
sidual NBS storage and use, states have failed on both ac-
counts, most importantly the least restrictive means require-
ment. Research to advance medical knowledge and develop new 
treatments is important, but it need not be achieved through 
the surreptitious attainment of genetic material.  
192 but 
there are still many opportunities to discuss what they want to 
do with their child’s residual NBS.193
 
 189. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (recogniz-
ing “a sphere within which the individual may . . . dispute the authority of any 
human government . . . to interfere with the exercise of that will”).  
 Part A proposes a model 
 190. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 325–8(g) (West 2008); IND. CODE § 16-41-9-1.5 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 191. Many states have “least restrictive means necessary” requirements in 
their quarantine statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 36-788 (2009); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136; HAW. REV. STAT. § 325–8(b); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 144.419 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:13-15 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 433.128 (West 2011). For further commentary on the importance of a due 
process procedure to govern quarantine decisions, see Gregory P. Campbell, 
The Global H1N1 Pandemic, Quarantine Law, and the Due Process Conflict, 
12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 497 (2011). 
 192. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 13 (acknowledging the sometimes-
chaotic atmosphere after childbirth).  
 193. These opportunities are present during pre-natal visits and post-
partum care/hospitalization. The majority of pregnant women in the United 
States receive “adequate” prenatal care, as defined by the Adequacy of Prena-
tal Care Utilization (APNCU) Index, which involves more than eleven prena-
tal care visits. See Geraldine Oliva et al., Birth Data Analysis & Presentation 
System Manual, EPIBC 2005 i-28 (2005), available at http://fhop.ucsf.edu/fhop/ 
docs/pdf/manuals/epibc05/EpiBC05man_all.pdf; America’s Health Rankings, 
USA Prenatal Care (1990–2011), UNITED HEALTH FOUND. (2013), http://www 
.americashealthrankings.org/All/PrenatalCare/2012 (indicating that roughly 
70% of women throughout the U.S. receive adequate prenatal care as defined 
by the APCNU Index). After giving vaginal birth, most women remain in the 
hospital for two days, and Congress has enacted legislation requiring group 
health plans to cover a minimum 48-hour post-partum hospital stay. See 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-25 (2006); Committee on Fetus and Newborn, Policy State-
ment—Hospital Stay for Healthy Term Newborns, 125 PEDIATRICS 405, 405 
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that states should consider when developing and implementing 
policies governing informed consent for residual NBS use. Parts 
B and C discuss different times when informed consent may be 
sought. States and public health researchers may resist such 
policy changes, claiming they are too burdensome to imple-
ment. States can certainly choose to maintain their current pol-
icies (or lack thereof), but given the recent litigation in Texas 
and Minnesota and the increasing publicity of state storage and 
use of residual NBS and other genetic material, failing to make 
changes increases the likelihood of future litigation. 
A. THE INADEQUACIES OF AN OPT-OUT MODEL AND THE NEED 
FOR AN OPT-IN PROFESSIONAL “REQUESTOR” POLICY 
States should implement “opt-in” rather than “opt-out” 
programs because opt-in policies promote information-sharing 
and provide a better opportunity for parents to make informed 
decisions.194 An opt-out system relies on presumed consent—
that parents agree to the storage and use of their child’s resid-
ual NBS unless they explicitly refuse.195 A potential problem 
with opt-out systems is that they “require[] that health care 
providers give parents more information than they currently 
do”196 about the initial screening and the residual storage and 
use of NBS.197 Therefore, an opt-out system “is not a true model 
of consent because it does not require any form of consent; in-
stead . . . [it] functions as a substitute for consent.”198
 
(2010), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/125/2/405/full 
.pdf; Employee Benefits Security Administration, Fact Sheet—Newborns’ and 
Mothers’ Health Protection Act, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/ 
newsroom/fsnmhafs.html#.UOiZQW9kw0U (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
 Assuming 
that silence is equivalent to consent is a problematic, and at 
times mistaken, assumption to make, particularly given the ev-
 194. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 24–25.  
 195. Ross, supra note 5, at 313.  
 196. Id.  
 197. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that many jurisdictions 
which allow parents to refuse the initial screenings do not require any patient-
provider communication prior to the screening). Additionally, providers may 
be unaware that refusal is an option, and thus do not inform parents of their 
right to opt-out. See Real Life Stories: Taking Baby DNA, CITIZENS’ COUNCIL 
ON HEALTH CARE (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.cchfreedom.org/pdf/ 
RealLifeStories%20BabyDNA-1FINAL.pdf (“Our nurses didn’t even know we 
could opt out, or that any collection was going to the government.”).  
 198. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 24 (emphasis added). 
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idence that many parents are ill-informed about residual stor-
age and use policies.199
An “opt-in” consent procedure is preferable because it re-
quires parents to provide “affirmative consent” to allow residu-
al NBS storage and use.
 
200 An opt-in policy requires knowledge 
and information on both sides: the “requestor” of consent must 
know the procedures for obtaining consent and what storage 
and use of residual NBS entails, and this information must be 
provided to parents before they can consent and “opt-in” to re-
sidual storage and use. This model increases the exchange of 
important information and requires improved training of the 
medical professionals obtaining consent.201 An opt-in program 
further ensures that parents have the opportunity to ask ques-
tions and address their concerns before deciding whether to 
consent to research using their newborn’s residual NBS. In-
deed, “the only way to be sure that someone is truly consent-
ing . . . is to obtain his or her affirmative consent.”202
An opt-in model is particularly preferable in light of the 
unclear risk-benefit ratio of residual NBS research.
  
203 In her 
discussion of opt-in versus opt-out consent procedures for the 
initial NBS screenings, Doctor Lainie Friedman Ross posits 
that while opt-out procedures for high benefit-risk ratio pro-
grams may be justifiable, when the benefit-risk ratio is unclear, 
an opt-in procedure is preferable because it “may provide the 
best way to balance respect for parental autonomy and the 
promotion of children’s health.”204 Because residual NBS re-
search has an unclear risk-benefit ratio, it is better suited for 
an opt-in policy, which will promote a balance between respect 
for parental autonomy and public health promotion.205
To facilitate the development of improved informed consent 
policies, a useful model for states to follow is a “requestor” 
model, which has been successfully used as part of the organ 
  
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. (emphasis added).  
 201. Currently, many medical professionals, such as obstetrical physicians 
and nurses, as well as pediatricians, lack adequate information and training 
about residual NBS storage and use. See id. at 24; Ross, supra note 5, at 319.  
 202. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 24 (emphasis added).  
 203. See supra Part II for a discussion of the lack of significant benefits 
from residual NBS research and the concomitant privacy risks and liberty in-
fringements of residual NBS use without parental consent.  
 204. Ross, supra note 5, at 320.  
 205. Id.  
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procurement process.206 Organ procurement organizations 
(OPOs) have implemented requestor programs in order to in-
crease the number of available organs.207 The United States or-
gan donation system operates under an “opt-in” model: the do-
nor himself can opt to be a donor prior to death208 or, if the 
deceased did not indicate his preference, the potential donor’s 
family is given the option of donation.209 The requestor model is 
a multi-disciplinary team approach to discussing and request-
ing organ donation from deceased individual’s family mem-
bers.210 Although an organ procurement requestor’s role begins 
at the end of life, an analogous requestor model can be used at 
the beginning of life to facilitate informed parental consent in 
procuring residual NBS for research. The circumstances in 
which they are asked may be different, but what is being asked 
of family members of the deceased or parents of a newborn is 
quite similar—whether they wish to donate their relative’s per-
sonal biological material for the purpose of promoting the 
health and well-being of others.211
 
 206. See, e.g., CAITLIN CARROLL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., ROLES AND TRAINING IN THE DONATION PROCESS: A RESOURCE GUIDE, 
at Preface (2000), available at http://www.wsha.org/files/62/ 
RolesAndTrainingGuide.pdf (discussing 42 C.F.R. Part 482, which “requires 
that those who [a] hospital designates to initiate donation requests receive 
training offered or approved by the [organ procurement organization]”). 
  
 207. Id. 
 208. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Acts of 1967 and 1987 established the 
right to donate all or part of one’s body upon death. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT 
ACT § 1–2 (1987). Each state has a donor registry where individuals can sign 
up to be organ donors. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., State Organ 
and Tissue Donor Registries, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/ 
becomingdonor/stateregistries.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).  
 209. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (2006) (allowing hospitals to participate in organ 
procurement if the “hospital establishes written protocols for the identification 
of potential organ donors that assure that families of potential organ donors 
are made aware of the option of organ or tissue donation and their option to 
decline”); see also UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3 (1987) (“Any member of the 
following classes . . . may make an anatomical gift of all or a part of the dece-
dent’s body for an authorized purpose, unless the decedent, at the time of 
death, has made an unrevoked refusal to make that anatomical gift . . . .”); 
CARROLL ET AL., supra note 206, at 14–15 (providing an overview of legislation 
relevant to the organ donation process).  
 210. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 206, at 17.  
 211. Organ donation has clear health benefits—in 2012, 22,187 transplants 
were performed using deceased donor organs. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., Deceased Donor Transplants in the U.S. by State, ORGAN PROCURE-
MENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ 
latestData/step2.asp (select Choose Category “Transplant” and select Choose 
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Several studies support the effective use of a multi-
disciplinary “team” approach in obtaining consent for organ do-
nation212 that could be applied NBS donation. The model in-
volves three roles which, although distinct, must collaborate for 
the requestor model to be successful. The three roles are (1) co-
ordinator; (2) requestor; and (3) supporter.213 The coordinator 
facilitates the collaboration of everyone involved in the process, 
ensuring that it is “carried out in accordance with relevant pol-
icies and protocols.”214 The requestor has the important job of 
empowering the parents to make decisions—he or she “is the 
individual who will offer the option of donation . . . or discuss 
donation with” the newborn’s parents.215 The supporter’s job is 
to assist everyone in the process—the coordinator, the reques-
tor, and the infant’s parents.216
Adequate training is essential to ensure effective and suc-
cessful use of the team approach. Training is particularly im-
portant for requestors, whose role brings them into intimate 
contact with parents during a momentous—and often over-
whelming—time in their lives and thus requires patience, un-
derstanding, and respect. A requestor could be an existing 
health care professional, such as a doctor, nurse, or social 
worker, or hospitals could hire and train a person whose sole 
job is to be a requestor. The model used by each hospital may 
differ, as larger hospitals with more births may benefit from 
having employees whose sole job is to request NBS donations. 
Some of the necessary components of a successful and respect-
ful donation request policy include
  
217: (1) understanding fami-
lies in the post-childbirth stage; (2) maintaining respect for the 
family; (3) developing communication skills; (4) getting to know 
the parents; (5) assessing family dynamics and modifying ap-
proaches; (6) being sensitive to cultural, religious, and spiritual 
influences;218
 
Organ “All,” follow “Deceased Donor Transplants by State”) (data last updated 
Oct. 11, 2013). 
 and (7) providing ongoing support and infor-
 212. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 206, at 17. 
 213. Id. at 17–18. 
 214. Id. at 18. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. 
 217. Adapted from id. at 27–29.  
 218. Successfully fulfilling numbers (5) and (6) may require matching a re-
questor with the parents, because “people tend to respond more positively to 
individuals that they feel they can trust or with whom they can identify.” Id. 
at 29. This can involve having a requestor that speaks the parents’ native lan-
guage, understands or practices the parents’ religion, and is of the same eth-
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mation. Regardless of the method chosen—using an existing 
employee to act as a requestor or hiring an employee whose sole 
role is to be a requestor—all health care providers who interact 
with parents—both pre-natal and post-natal—should receive 
training and education on residual NBS policies, as there is 
currently a general lack of knowledge about this topic among 
the medical profession.219
Storage and use of residual NBS can be a complicated topic 
to understand and parents may have numerous questions. 
Therefore, the requestor must be willing and able to spend con-
siderable time with parents to ensure they have ample oppor-
tunity to ask questions and understand the storage process and 
what their child’s NBS may be used for during research.
  
220
State policies should allow parents to change their minds 
and later request that their child’s stored NBS be destroyed. 
Requestors must have adequate training in and understanding 
of the process of de-identification or anonymization of NBS, and 
states should enact policies that require anonymization, a pro-
cess that strips the blood sample of all identifiers so that the 
sample is—as much as is scientifically possible—anonymous 
and nearly impossible to trace back to the particular infant.
  
221
B. PRE-NATAL CARE DISCUSSIONS AND CONSENT 
  
The ideal scenario is to begin discussions about residual 
NBS storage and use during pre-natal care. The requestor, 
along with pre-natal care providers—who should receive specif-
ic training and education on their state’s newborn screening 
program and NBS retention policies—could introduce the idea 
of residual NBS research to the parent(s) at prenatal care vis-
its. Alternatively, separate appointments could be made for the 
sole purpose of discussing residual NBS use to ensure the re-
questor has adequate time to explain the policies and proce-
 
nic, racial, or cultural background as the parents. Id. at 29. Using “like” re-
questors is associated with improved donation rates among both African 
American and Hispanic individuals. See, e.g., Susan L. Bratton et al., Pediatric 
Organ Transplantation Needs: Organ Donation Best Practices, 160 ARCHIVES 
PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 468, 469 (2006); JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDI-
TATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., HEALTH CARE AT THE CROSSROADS: STRATE-
GIES FOR NARROWING THE ORGAN DONATION GAP AND PROTECTING PATIENTS 
8, 13, 18 (2004), available at http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/ 
organ_donation_white_paper.pdf.  
 219. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 24; Ross, supra note 5, at 319. 
 220. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 206, at 27.  
 221. OLSON & BERGER, supra note 107, at 31–32. 
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dures and to allow the parents to ask questions. It should be 
clear to parents that they have the option to refuse residual 
NBS retention and use. The pre-natal discussions would be on-
going and final decisions would not be made nor consent given 
until after the child’s birth. Beginning the discussion as early 
as possible allows parents to think through their decisions and 
to ask questions. This method recognizes that informed consent 
should be more than a signature on a page—it should be a pro-
cess during which the consenter comes to know and truly un-
derstand what it is he or she is consenting to.  
C. POST-NATAL DISCUSSIONS AND CONSENT 
The unfortunate reality is that not all women receive pre-
natal care222
Contrary to some arguments, parental consent is possible 
for residual NBS research. The costs and burdens of an opt-in, 
consensual procedure are inadequate justifications to complete-
ly forego parental consent. In an age of impressive advance-
ments in genomic medicine, we must be aware of potential pri-
vacy issues and draw lines early and often between legitimate 
and illegitimate use of our genetic information without consent. 
 and thus pre-natal discussions will not always be 
possible. In such situations, after the woman has given birth 
and recuperated, but prior to discharge, a trained requestor 
should engage the parent(s) in a discussion about storage and 
residual use. The conversation should not occur immediately 
prior to discharge, as the woman is likely receiving other in-
formation at this time and may be in a hurry to get out of the 
hospital. In a rush to complete a mountain of discharge paper-
work, the parent(s) may make hurried judgments that are not 
truly informed and well thought-out. All parents should be giv-
en time to think about their decision if they are unsure—
residual NBS should not be disseminated for research purposes 
for at least one month after the infant is born. Requestors could 
follow-up with a phone call to discuss the parent’s decision, an 
appointment could be made, or the issue could be re-visited at 
the newborn’s one-month physical. Parents should not feel 
rushed into the decision—if they are not ready to provide con-
sent, they should have additional time.  
 
 222. In 2010, approximately 6.2% of mothers received late (defined as 
third-trimester or later) or no prenatal care. CHILD TRENDS DATA BANK, LATE 
OR NO PRENATAL CARE: INDICATORS ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH app. 1, at 9 
(2012), available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ 
25_Prenatal_Care.pdf.  
  
2013] THAT’S MY BABY 453 
 
As a society, we cannot allow administrative costs or burdens to 
justify infringements on individual rights, parental rights, and 
genetic privacy. Protections and safeguards are possible—we 
simply must be willing to spend the time and resources to de-
velop and implement them. 
  CONCLUSION   
The government’s interest in and obligation to promote 
public health is historically, legally, and socially acknowledged. 
This interest cannot, however, justify non-consensual use of re-
sidual NBS. Although residual NBS research has the potential 
to promote public health through discovery of new diseases and 
treatment, such benefits have thus far been tenuous at best. A 
state’s police power is not absolute and cannot be invoked to 
justify a blanket waiver of parental consent for residual NBS 
use. To avoid future litigation, states must address their inade-
quate or altogether non-existent policies governing residual 
NBS retention and use. These policies should include a robust 
informed consent procedure that will increase transparency 
and seek a balance between individual rights and the im-
portance of public health research that aims to detect new con-
ditions, develop new therapies, and eradicate diseases. 
 
